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State of the Art
Feminism in Plural:
Women’s Studies in Turkey
Marianne Gr&uuml;nell and Anneke Voeten
FACULTEIT DER SOCIAAL CULTURELE WETENSCHAPPEN, FREE UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN, THE
NETHERLANDS
’We don’t believe in miracles, we rely on them’, this according to the poster
on the wall of the NGO secretariat of the Habitat II conference in Istanbul.
Il read the slogan as I tried in vain to trace $irin Tekeli for an interview.
According to the programme, the ex-professor of political sciences and
well-known feminist Tekeli had just delivered a lecture on ’Women-
friendly Space’. Istanbul played host to the UN Habitat II conference in
June 1996, and I thought - naively perhaps - this would be a good oppor-
tunity for ’a state of the art’ piece on women’s studies in Turkey. But this
provincial from Amsterdam felt quite lost in a part of the world which
relies on miracles, and where cities have populations in the tens of mil-
lions and conferences have 20,000 participants. Fortunately, with a little
help from my friends, this project was saved from premature failure.
Before I get down to the nitty gritty, I give you this illustration to sketch
my frame of reference and its limits. I visited the Women’s Library and
Information Centre in Istanbul and was ultimately able to interview $irin
Tekeli and AY1?e Dfzkan, a radical feminist, who recalled that Tekeli had
introduced the word ’feminism’ into Turkish. Tekeli herself says: ’Oh, no,
I wouldn’t have dared in 1982. We got Giselle Halimi, a French-Tunisian
feminist to do it for us.’
Both Tekeli and Düzkan discussed feminism in the 1980s with me, and
once back home in the Netherlands I pursued my investigations at the
women’s studies library in Amsterdam, the IIAV For Turkey 1990 was a
landmark year - not only was the first shelter for battered women opened
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there, but that year also saw the launch of the Women’s Library and Docu-
mentation Centre.3 Also in 1990 the first centre for women’s studies was
started at the University of Istanbul, followed in subsequent years by the
University of Ankara, the qukurova University in Adana and the
Marmara University in Istanbul (N. Arat, 1996: 406). The Bosphorus Uni-
versity in Istanbul and the Middle East Technical University in Ankara
have both offered undergraduate courses in women’s studies since the
1980s, and the latter now has a MA programme in gender studies. The
centres initiate and coordinate interdisciplinary women’s studies research,
offer seminars outside the regular curriculum and courses which are inte-
grated in the curriculum. The current aim is to initiate a PhD programme.
Women’s studies are usually developed within disciplines such as politi-
cal science, sociology, economics and philosophy. But the centres not only
concentrate on curricula and research, they are also action oriented. Just
to give one example here: the centre in Istanbul launched a petition to
change civil law which would lead to more equality between men and
women, while students initiated a campaign against virginity checks.
Second-wave feminism has also penetrated government and its insti-
tutions : a ’General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women’ has
been in force since 1990. But this ’state of the art’ won’t elaborate on these
institutions here, it rather gives an impression of the content of women’s
studies, with a focus on the history of feminist waves in Turkey, and its
relationships with Kemalist, Marxist and Islamic traditions.
THE 1980S: ANOTHER MILITARY COUP AND ANOTHER
FEMINIST WAVE
Looking back in hindsight to the 1980s surge of ‘the second feminist wave’
in Turkey cannot be done without reference to the prevalent political situ-
ation. When I interviewed 5irin Tekeli and Ay~e Dfzkan, there was a lot
of speculation about a possible military coup, which would be the fourth
in 36 years.4 The underlying cause was the failure of right-wing secular
parties to cooperate in a coalition government. Tansu Ciller, leader of the
True Path Party (DYP), proved unable to work with Mesut Yilmaz, leader
of the Motherland Party (ANAP). This opened up a potentially central role
for Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in the
country’s administration. Although the Welfare Party came out of the
December 1995 elections as the biggest - although with a very tiny
majority - the question was whether the army, defenders of the secular
state par excellence, would allow the Islamists to exercise political power
at his highest levels. As I talked with 5irin Tekeli in June 1996, she voiced
the sentiments of what are called in Turkey ’defenders of the civil society’:
’I am a democrat; I have to accept the existence of the Islamic party and
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the results of the elections, but I am afraid of both scenarios.’ While writing
this article the situation changed as Tansu Ciller, Turkey’s first female
prime minister, broke her election promises and began negotiating - suc-
cessfully - with the Islamists. After the novelty of the first female prime
minister had worn off, Turkey then saw the inauguration of its first
Islamist prime minister.
The differences encapsulated in these two ’primeurs’ not only illustrate
Turkey’s history, but are also only too apparent in the streets: veiled
women, either in elegant up-to-the-minute Islamic fashion or decked from
head to foot in black; equally elegant worldfashion-style power suits;
teenagers in knee-high boots and the latest fashions - they are all here in
Istanbul, one of four major cities in this country of 60 million. Tekeli speaks
diplomatically of a mosaic in which the different cultures - urban, rural -
and differences in standard of living - wealthy or poverty line - can coexist
side by side. These differences are also more than obvious when we begin
talking about women in Turkey. This is a country with a female illiteracy
rate of 31 percent (10 percent among males), but also the highest percent-
age (32 percent) of female academic personnel in the world (Acar, 1991;
Noordenbos, 1994-95). Yet few of these women have reached the top jobs,
for example as dean, in any of the universities. The fact Turkey had a
female prime minister should not cloud the fact that less than 3 percent of
politicians are women (Arat, 1989; Gunes-Ayata, 1995). Sexuality is
strongly regulated in this country; abortion may be legal, but married
women need their husband’s consent. Almost the whole population is
Muslim, with Sunnis in the majority and a minority of Alevis, a hetero-
dox, humanist variation within Shii Islamic teaching. Although the
number of ’unbelievers’ is probably growing, the majority of both groups
are practising and a minority of Sunni Muslims adhere to a form of politi-
cal Islam. The most important platform of this minority is the Welfare
Party (Refah Partisi). At the same time, the whole state infrastructure has
been based on secular principles along Western nation-state lines. Mixing
politics and religion is prohibited by law and the whole legal system,
including family law, has been stripped of religious principles. Since the
1950s, Turkey has undergone enormous migration from rural to urban
areas. This has led to problems, especially as urban infrastructures have
been unable to handle the continual influxes from the countryside. Rural
and city cultures also collided, a situation which was not helped by
extremely high inflation and persistent unemployment; according to
official statistics, 20.5 percent of urban women are unemployed, while
total urban unemployment is 11.7 percent (The Status of Women in Turkey,
1994: 33). This is a country which is also extremely ethnically diverse; its
oppression of Kurdish identity has the characteristics of an internal’dirty
war’. Turkey is also assured of a place on international political agendas
when it comes to human rights violations. Clearly, this is a country of great
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contrasts, where it was possible for the army to seize power back in 1980,
banning all political activities and outlawing political parties. And yet at
the same time it is also a country where a new feminist movement could
emerge not too many years later which is able to exercise influence at
national level.
Feminists organized several public actions in the 1980s, when almost all
political activists were restricted. Under these conditions, the feminist
movement became one of the most important civil and democratic forces
in Turkey. In 1986, an ad hoc committee of feminists organized a petition
campaign to ask the government to comply with the 1979 UN Convention
on the Abolition of All Discrimination against Women. This Convention
passed through parliament in 1985 because the Turkish government
wanted to participate in the UN conference on women’s issues in Nairobi.
However, little has been done to enforce the Convention. About 7000
women signed the petition, which was passed from hand to hand in order
not to violate the law. Students were prohibited from signing as university
disciplinary regulations prohibited the expression of opinions on the
country’s problems. If they did sign, they risked expulsion from the uni-
versity. On 8 March 1986 the petition was presented to parliament. In 1987,
feminists organized the first street demonstration - with 3000 participants
- since the military coup of 1980. This protest against wife-battering was
inspired by a rejected petition for divorce by an abused spouse. The judge
in the case praised the husband : ’You do not leave a women’s back without
a stick, nor her belly without a child.’ The demonstration represented the
start of a campaign which lasted until the first shelter was opened for bat-
tered wives. Another action tackled sexual harassment. The ’purple needle
campaign’ was so called because in the past a needle with a coloured head
was used by women to warn men who came too ’close’. The next femin-
ist action took place in January 1989 as a reaction against a decision by the
Constitutional Court on Article 438 of the Penal Code. This Article stated
that if a woman involved in a rape case was a prostitute, then the rapist’s
sentence could be reduced by up to two-thirds. A rape case was brought
before the Supreme Court which decided that the rape article did not con-
travene Article 10 of the Constitution which regulates equality between
the sexes. The Court supported its judgment by claiming that Article 10
was designed to protect the rights of ’honest women’ only. In response,
feminists caused a ’scandal’ by declaring ’we are all prostitutes’. In the end
the National Assembly abolished Article 438.
This period of intensive discussions and actions culminated in 1989 in the
first Feminist Congress held in Ankara and ending with a manifesto which
summarizes ten years of feminist thinking and an official ideological
divorce between feminism and socialism (Tekeli, 1992a, 19955). These public
actions are not only the result of a broad-based women’s movement but -
as we shall see - also of a revolution in ideas.
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THE KEMALIST HERITAGE REVISED: BEYOND THE LAWS
Sirin Tekeli’s life story illustrates the history of feminist thinking in
Turkey. Daughter of a mother who was professor in philosophy, she
studied political sciences in Switzerland and returned to an academic
career in Turkey. After the coup in 1980 she and almost 1500 colleagues
- most of them leftist, as Tekeli is herself - left the university in protest
against the anti-democratic restructuring of the universities and the abol-
ition of autonomy. She then devoted her energies full-time to feminism,
not only through her academic work, but also as one of the initiators of
the second feminist wave. With other academic feminists, she stripped
away dominant historic perceptions of the first feminist wave: not only
a suffrage movement in the United Kingdom and the United States, but
in Turkey also.
Here, as elsewhere, the first feminist wave struggled for women’s access
to the public sphere. Reforms took place between 1926 and 1934, suffrage
for women, the secularization of marriage - which meant abolition of
polygamy and spousal repudiation, and more equality between men and
women in marriage, divorce, property and inheritance matters. Women
also received access to all levels of education. These reforms were part of
the modernization programme that designed the Turkish national state.
Better known as Kemalism, this programme takes its name from the
nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal, the later Atatfrk. Serpil ~§akir, who is
researching women’s magazines from the late Ottoman period - a collec-
tion which is considered one of the treasures of the women’s library in
Istanbul - when this nationalist movement developed, points out the large
number of women’s periodicals at the beginning of the century. Around
1913, there were no less than 45, most of which survived for around ten
years. ’By studying these magazines, we were able to discover the extent
of women’s influence and the powerful way in which they couched their
demands’, she says. ’They resisted sexual violence, demanded the abol-
ition of polygamy, and fought for equal rights at both economic and politi-
cal levels’ (Tankeren, 1993: 43). Some of these demands were met within
the Kemalist programme which saw formal emancipation as an inherent
part of modernization, and used women, as Kandiyoti claims, as symbolic
pawns (Kandiyoti, 1989: 145).
The second feminist wave began by criticizing this half-emancipation
which had realized certain formal opportunities for women, but kept them
dependent through a civil code which, for instance, ruled that the husband
was head of the family and required married women to obtain their
husband’s permission before performing paid work. This latter Article
was, in fact, abolished in the 1980s following pressure from the women’s
movement. Zhera F. Arat analyses the heritage of Kemalism as ’the Re-
publican Reconstruction of Tradition’:
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In spite of these reforms, the Kemalist state continued to employ a tra-
ditional definition of female roles and emphasized reproduction and child
care as the primary functions of women. Treating women as symbols and as
tools of modernization and Westernization, rather than as equal and full
partners of men, the Kemalist reforms intended to achieve little in changing
women’s lot.... The restrictive effects of the Kemalist reforms and mental-
ity continue to the present. To this day, both education and employment of
women have remained limited; they have been mostly accessible to upper
class urban women, but have failed to liberate even that segment of the
population. (Z. Arat, 1994: 72)
In her article ’Emancipated But Unliberated?’, Deniz Kandiyoti explains
the limitation of the Kemalist programme to elite urban women as follows:
’women’s education has acted not so much as a means of mobility but as
a means of class consolidation, because these women might have posed
less of a threat than upwardly mobile men from humbler origins’ (Kandiy-
oti, 1987: 323).
Tekeli also shares this criticism on the limitations in Kemalist feminism.
She calls it ’state feminism’ (Tekeli, 1992), a framework which is unable to
explain why, for example, women are so grossly underrepresented in poli-
tics. Writing from a Marxist conceptual framework in the early 1980s in
the reader Women in Turkish Society, she described women’s political dis-
interest. Ultimately, she concluded then that this was generated by a cap-
italistic production system which was characterized by a specific division
of labour between the sexes. In this system, men are responsible for pro-
duction and women for reproduction, resulting in their exclusion from
political and social decision-making. These relations were ideologically
reproduced in political culture and it is this ideology which leads women
to believe that politics is not their territory. This is a view in which asym-
metrical relations between the sexes are understood from production
relations and in which more equality depends on a change in those
relations, on a socialist revolution (Tekeli, 1985). However, from the begin-
ning of the 1980s, Tekeli and many with her began searching for different
questions and different answers.
THE LEFT-WING HERITAGE REVISED: NEW QUESTIONS
AND NEW ANSWERS
Tekeli recalls how it all began:
I was asked by the writers’ and translators’ collective Yazko, who’d organized
meetings on issues such as women, sexuality, intellectuals, to set up a journal
on women’s issues. I worked with five other women who were also inter-
ested in women’s issues, but we didn’t have the words, we didn’t dare, we
were afraid that everybody would be against us - the military, the Kemalists
and the Islamists. The time simply wasn’t right. But by talking together,
finding the words and the strength, we formed what you would call a con-
sciousness-raising-group. Here we discovered the issues and problems which
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on March 15, 2011ejw.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
225
proved characteristic of the second feminist wave: the reality that the private
is political. In 1982, we organized a seminar where Giselle Halimi reintro-
duced the word feminism for us. Reactions were enthusiastic and discussion
groups mushroomed. More women formed small groups, and 40 wanted to
set up a journal. From small beginnings this idea soon became a page in the
Yazko weekly Somut (Concrete). In those days, political parties were out-
lawed, but we were talking political issues. It is a miracle that we had the
courage, and were tolerated by the military. Many women came from leftist
political parties or groups and were marxist oriented. This was the first time
they were able to think from a women’s perspective and shake off marxist
concepts, not only on the issue of who is being oppressed by what, but also
on forms of (democratic) organisation. We discovered just how thoroughly
Turkish society was permeated by patriarchal and sexist concepts and the
’fact’ that daily private life is the real arena of patriarchy. After six months we
stopped writing for Somut. In 1983 we continued with our own women’s
organization, Kadin gevresi (Women’s Circle), which was a broad program for
women’s assistance on health and legal questions, violence and divorce, but
we also had a women’s cafe and facilities for publishing and translating.
Because of financial problems, this program was only partly realized. We
translated feminist classics, such as Simone de Beauvoir and Alice Schwarzer;
we started our own journal Feminist. The first issue was published 8 March
1987 and editorial goals were stated: We have been reflecting on the nature
of our exploitation for some time, but this journal gave us the courage to
speak out about what affects us personally. As you know, we, the feminists,
think the private is political. (cited in Y. Arat, 1994: 103)
Ay§e Dfzkan, one of the writers to the journal, recalls: ’[the journal]
brought a fresh breath to social opposition ... questioned hierarchy, even
authority ... [and] brought a frivolous, naive, cheerful definition to the
word feminist that is customarily used as an obscene word’ (cited in Y.
Arat, 1994: 103).
It was also in this period that reactions against their independent course
began to emerge from the leftist movement, which had brought forth
many feminists. In her analysis of those reactions, Fatmagül Berktay
writes that the left may have approved to women organizing separately,
yet the left remained convinced that women would ultimately fight
against the system side-by-side with men. Meanwhile the feminists were
also substantially suspected of ’bourgeois tendencies’. She describes the
unique use by the left of the concepts love, responsibility and trust when
calling on politically active women, concepts which imply that: ’You are
opposed to sharing and partnership, so you must hate all men as such;
you want to lead a life of independence and freedom, so you must be unre-
liable and irresponsible; you want to develop your own individuality, so
you must be after your own selfish interests; you no longer behave in so
docile and conciliatory a fashion, so you are cold and loveless’ (Berktay,
1995: 259). Ultimately Berktay comes to the same conclusions as Sheila
Rowbotham in 1973 in her Women’s Consciousness, Men’s World: ’men’s
revolution has a symbolism for the outer shape of things, and the inner
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world goes along on the old tracks’. Berktay’s article is published in
Tekeli’s reader Women in Modern Turkish Society (Tekili, 1995), which is
referred to frequently in this article. In 1993 Ye~im Arat analyses the reader
as typical for the 1980s: it reflects the plurality of women’s viewpoints, the
concepts used are ’partriarchy’ and ’gender’: the collection portrays ’the
historically specific subjectivity’ of women examining their subjugation as
well as power (Y. Arat, 1993: 129).
Tekeli continues:
As the movement grew it was no longer the exclusive preserve of well-
educated, middle-class, professional women over 30, but now including
other groups - younger women, women working in factories and shops and
female students. The movement radicalized and reformist and radical wings
appeared. Yet the different groups didn’t decry each other and this was a
new phenomenon in Turkey. What they shared was the realization that we
wanted to work outside the political party structure and that we wanted to
be non-hierarchical.
One of the expressions of differentiation within the feminist movement
was the appearance of a new magazine in 1988, Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus
(Socialist Feminist Cactus). The Kaktfs group wanted space for its own
perception of feminism and argued: ’ideology alone was not what gener-
ated male-female inequality, rather the network of gender as well as pro-
duction relations accounted for this inequality’ (cited in Y. Arat,1994:104).
The magazine Pazartesi (Monday), which appeared in 1995, is the most
recent effort in feminist publishing. Dfzkan, one of its editors, places the
journal in context:
Pazartesi tries to form an answer to the backlash of feminism; we want to be
professional and popular, local - which means Turkish - and ’politically
correct’ - that is feminist. We try to have our own agenda and write about
women’s issues from the point of view of women. Typical for our journal is
also that we write about news, for instance on a whore house strike which
took place in Istanbul.
And typical for Düzkan is perhaps her sense of humour; she writes
columns on issues as varied as the use of make-up, which she sees as a
way of expressing oneself publicly, a social code, a way of distinction.
Düzkan argues: ’Humour is important in Turkey; readers like it, it gives
them weapons against men. As patriarchy works through words, let the
words then work for you.’
Magazines such as Somut, Feminist, Sosyalist Feminist Kaktos and
Pazartesi distinguish themselves from the ageing women’s magazine
Kadinca, which has a large circulation and where Duygu Asena was
already writing on the position of women in the late 1970s. Asena is argu-
ably the best-known feminist in Turkey. Besides magazine journalism, she
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is also author of two bestsellers - Woman Has No Name (1989) and In Fact
There Is Also No Love (1989) - in which she speaks freely about sex and
relationships and about the real resistance against career women. Ten
years on and ’the Kadmca perspective’ and its limitations are being
analysed from a critical feminist perspective. Ay~e Saktanber points out
that although Kadmca writes freely on women’s sexuality and although it
introduces the ’3 K formula’ to define the three basic elements of orgasm,
klitoris, kafa (head) and koca (husband), the latter shows that women’s
legitimate sexuality is within marriage - and for Kadmca also. Kadmca’s
world is urban, middle class, and it is from that perspective that the maga-
zine raises discrimination of women in the public and private sphere,
albeit in a challenging and direct manner (Saktanber, 1995). Ay*e Dfzkan
is also critical, but emphasizes the development expressed in publications
like Kadinca and a similar publication, Elele:
The magazines published for women readers address a certain type of audi-
ence. This is a new type of readership. In Turkey, an urban mass of working
women has emerged, some married, some living alone. These magazines
address them and they sell well; so they can finance themselves. This is an
indication of real support. (Ahiska, 1994: 4-5)
At present, this new urban middle class may form no more than a small
segment in society - it is part of the 18 percent of working women who
work outside agriculture6 - but it continues to grow.
THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL
As elsewhere, a revolutionary core concept of the Turkish second femin-
ist wave is that the personal is political. But what does it mean in Turkey?
Tekeli speaks of ’the real arena of patriarchy’.
The most piercing example is the case of sexual violence. This was, there-
fore, an important issue for feminism. To undermine beliefs and prejudices
we always worked with facts - proofs, testimonies - but we lacked this
material on sexual abuse and rape so other methods had to be applied. We
started public actions such as publicly declaring ’we are all prostitutes’. We
did the same in our campaign against battering - the court case against the
wife who didn’t get a divorce because her husband was beating her. In this
case, we published the book Cry, Let Everybody Hear in 1988, in which 23 bat-
tered women told their stories.
The agenda-setting role of the women’s movement and its success in politi-
cizing the personal is demonstrated by the policy and in the reports of the
Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (part of the State
Ministry for Women’s Affairs and Social Services). The Directorate gives
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financial support to shelters for battered women and in one official publi-
cation, violence against women is recognized as’a serious problem’, whose
’real dimensions’ remain unknown (The Status of Women, 1994: 35). The
Directorate also points in this context at articles in the Criminal Code and
criticizes its basic principles. It states that sexual assault and rape as such
are not seen as crimes, as the penalties depend on the status of the victim:
a single woman, a married woman or a virgin. As a critical conclusion the
Directorate states that the crime depends, according to the law, not on the
act of rape, but on the virginity of the victim. Thus, the Criminal Code pro-
tects General Morality and Family Order rather than the individual
woman. Another point of criticism are the virginity checks, which were
introduced in student hostels. Girls had to undergo an examination to
determine whether their virginal membrane was still intact. This practice
led to widespread protest and discussion. The student anger came to a head
after some girls committed suicide. Female students of the University of
Istanbul raised a petition against this practice.
Physical abuse and domestic mistreatment is another issue (The Status
of Women, 1994: 38-9). From the scarce research which has appeared (see,
for example, Yfksel, 1995) the Directorate concludes that violence occurs
across the social classes; that 45 percent of men think husbands have the
right to beat ’disobedient’ wives; that 66 percent believe men have abso-
lute authority at home and women have to obey them; 32 percent of men
and 20 percent of women approve of men beating their wives. Moreover,
the Directorate challenges the state itself directly when it remarks that the
recognition of violence against women as a basic violation of human rights
does not mean that ’this recognition has become ingrained in the public
opinion, both men and women, and state institutions’ (The Status of
Women, 1994: 40).
Just how public the most private is, can be concluded from the decisive
role of virginity in laws and regulations, which is rooted in the practice of
- borrowing from Kandiyoti - ’corporate control over female sexuality’.
The whole immediate social environment ensures a young woman’s vir-
ginity - significant for family honour or lineage - is saved for the right
man, chosen by the family. A lot of marriages are still arranged; in 1968 the
percentage was 67 percent, according to Kandiyoti (1987: 325). In the
extended family pattern, women marry into the household of the man’s
family and the young bride is subordinated to her mother-in-law. In this
system she establishes her own separate nuclear household when her
father-in-law dies and his sons become head of their own households. The
mother-in-law generally stays with her eldest son. Kandiyoti points out
the paucity of power a newly-wed woman has in such an arranged mar-
riage and how much power can be derived over time once she herself
becomes a mother-in-law (Kandiyoti, 1987). Although this family system
is eroding as migration to the cities increases and a growing number of
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people live more or less independently in nuclear families, it is clear that
the world of the magazine Kadmca is far removed from this type of family
relations. Protests against the double standard in judgments on sexual vio-
lence and against virginity controls are confronting a massive wall of tra-
dition which was almost untouched by Kemalist reforms.
SECULARISM REVISED: THE ISLAMIC CONFRONTATION
Untouched by the Kemalist reforms, raised in a patriarchal conservative,
lower middle-class culture and migrating from rural areas and provincial
towns to the metropoles - that is the sociological profile of Islamic women 4
Feride Acar (1995) sketches in her article ’Women and Islam in Turkey’. Is
it the case that ’the Islamic discourse is able to address those very realms
of women’s lives ignored by the Kemalist’, as Nfkhet Sirman (1989: 29)
states? This question brings us to the third movement within Turkish
society, alongside Kemalist and left-wing traditions, with which feminism
has to relate: political Islam. With only a few percent more votes than the
DYP and ANAP and only a total of 22 percent of the vote, the Islamist
Refah Partisi was still the largest political party. What is striking is the high
number of women in the electorate and in this party’s membership. And
it is a bitter pill for the secular feminist movement to conclude that it is
the Islamic movement which can mobilize the greater number of women.
Major mobilization has surrounded the abolition of the prohibition on
headscarves in state institutions, including universities. Cihan Akta§ is
one of the intellectual spokespeople; she considers feminism as ’a fantasy
of an elite’, imported from the West (cited in Oztfrk, 1992: 53). In her two
books Woman, The Exploited (1984) and The Adventure of Being a Woman
(1986) Akta~ analyses the oppression of women from an Islamic point of
view, in which she argues from the perspective of the complementary
nature of both sexes. Kemalism and its formal equality ideology is, of
course, one of the greatest bones of contention.
The Islamic movement holds secularism and modernism responsible for
the humiliation and exploitation of women and tries to appeal to dissatis-
fied and disillusioned women through promises of emancipation via
Islam, according to Feride Acar. In the cited article ’Women and Islam in
Turkey’ she analyses why Islam exerts such a powerful attraction to
women. She studied the contents of three Islamic women’s magazines -
Kadm ve Aile (Women and Family), Bizim Aile (Our Family) and Mektup
(Letter). In all three magazines, a woman’s role as wife, mother and home-
maker was emphasized above any other role she may possibly fulfil.
Highly controversial issues, which in conservative interpretations are part
of the sharia (Islamic law) - polygamy, a husband’s right to physically
punish his wife, two women’s testimony being considered equal to one
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man’s in a court of law - were largely ignored. Along with her analyses of
the magazines, Acar interviewed female Islamic students, asking about
their fears and expectations. She concludes here that women expect
security from Islam; it justifies traditional sex roles. One of the students
told her: ’but since the man I will marry will share my world view, he will
know that he is obliged to take care of me. The most important duty of
women under Islam is to give birth to children and to raise them properly.
I am going to the university in order to be able to educate my children in
the best way. I am increasing my knowledge to this end. I have no expec-
tation of earning money’ (cited in Acar, 1995: 58). The values with which
many women and girls are raised are in conflict with perceptions of
progress, equal justice and secularism which are disseminated by schools
and the state. The veil and the segregation of the sexes offer a security, a
protection from the potential threats of modern secular lifestyles and the
appeals of Westernized women, especially concerning sexuality. The more
liberal atmosphere of the big city is frightening and makes women feel
insecure; the rules of Islamic modesty and veiling requirements are bound
to ease the pressure on these women and protect their sense of self (Acar,
1995).
Ye~im Arat (1995) maintains a different approach. Where Acar tries to
understand the attraction of Islam to women, Arat concentrates on the
relationship between feminism and Islam. She points out the unintended
consequences of women’s Islamic activism. The concept of individual
rights especially, for instance to cover themselves, could help women dis-
cover and challenge Islamic restrictions on their liberties. In the context of
politics that aims to be democratic as well as secular, recognizing Islamic
women for what they are is a step towards democratization (Y. Arat, 1995:
77). That is why feminists did not support the campaign against the
freedom to wear the veil, on which Tekeli writes: ’feminists opt for respect-
ing individual women’s choices and are sceptical about the legitimacy of
the politics of radical secularism which may hinder the building of a tol-
erant and pluralistic society, while at the same time blocking islamic
fundamentalism’ (Tekeli, 1992b: 141).
In personal conversations with both Düzkan and Tekeli this point of
Islam and feminist options is of irrevocable importance. When I ask
Düzkan whether I have understood her correctly if I label her attitudes on,
for example, fashion as liberal, I appear to have pushed the wrong button.
She responds with:
I can’t identify with Western ideology, we are anti-imperialist and anti-
United States. Religion is part of our national identity, Islam is an organic
part of this country. Turkey has no own liberal tradition; still we must find
our own way to democracy. It can’t be imported from the West.
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Tekeli also points out this paradox:
We never had a Voltaire; we don’t have Turkish sources for democracy; our
own sources are religious. Our history is one of a centralized state, a mili-
tary based empire; a strong state and a weak civil society; individuals didn’t
exist here.
Back at home, I reread what Ye~im Arat says on this subject in ’Women’s
Movement of the 1980s in Turkey: Radical Outcome of Liberal Kemalism?’
(1994). The main difference between liberal or Kemalist feminists and the
younger generation is their view of Islam and secularism, she writes. The
first group sees Islam as the biggest threat to male-female equality and
some women have even argued that a war has to be waged for secularism
before women’s equality to men or liberation can be sought. The younger
generation of feminists gives priority to women’s liberation, rather than
to secularism, although they agree upon the patriarchal context of Islam,
which is seen as the reason why it could not be reconciled with feminism
(Y. Arat, 1994: 108-9). Arat concludes that the new feminist movement in
the 1980s unintentionally helped to realize the Kemalist reforms in that it
worked to reconcile secularism and democracy (Y. Arat, 1994: 110).
With all these different heritages and traditions, the feminist option for
respecting individual choices and moving towards a tolerant and plural-
istic society is a significant and understandable choice, whether these con-
cepts originated in the West or not. Women’s studies research and
reflections on the desires and fears of all the different women in Turkey,
on their experiences and social position can only underpin this option. In
this context, Deniz Kandiyoti’s suggestion to broaden the agenda of
women’s studies acquires additional meaning:
... to include the whole range of social institutions and practices which are
implicated in the creation and reproduction of gender hierarchies, that we
pay particular attention to the tensions and contradictions implicit in differ-
ent institutional spheres, and that we probe into the production of specific
forms of masculinity and femininity in the Turkish context. (Kandiyoti, 1995:
315)
NOTES
1. The ’I’ in this article is Gr&uuml;nell; she carried out the interviews in Istanbul.
2. The International Information Centre and Archive for the Women’s Move-
ment.
3. For the history of the library and its foundation see Women’s Memory (1992).
4. Coup d’etats occurred in 1960, 1971 and 1980.
5. We refer in this article to the 1995 English translation of the publication; the
German version was published in 1991.
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6. In 1990 82 percent of working women worked in the agricultural sector, of
which 89 percent as unpaid family workers. The labour participation rate of
women in the rural areas was more than 48 percent, while in the cities 15
percent (The Status of Women, 1994: 32-5). The same proportion (15 percent)
work in the informal sector, according to estimations (Ozbay, 1995).
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